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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper examines how government employment support should depend on the age of the unemployed job searchers. We assume, quite plausibly, that the government aims to minimize unemployment subject to a government budget constraint. We focus on one family of policy instruments for reducing unemployment: hiring subsidies for the unemployed. In practice, these instruments can come in many guises, such as tax breaks, vouchers, grants and so on. Since these are broadly equivalent in their impact, we will consider them jointly under the heading 'employment vouchers'. These vouchers are an appropriate way of addressing the market failures highlighted by the insideroutsider, labour-union, and efficiency-wage theories, since these market failures all give rise to excessive wages and an associated deficient labour demand, whereas the vouchers reduce firms' labour costs and thereby stimulate labour demand.
We give special attention to budget-balancing vouchers, Le. vouchers that cost the government no more than the resulting fall in the government's expenditure on unemployment benefits. Given this policy approach, we examine how employment vouchers to the youth unemployed should differ from those to the adult unemployed.
We show that the optimal employment vouchers to the youth unemployed may differ from those to the adult unemployment due to: a) youth-adult differences in hiring and separation rates in the absence of the vouchers; b) youth-adult differences in the hiring effect of the vouchers ('voucher effectiveness'); and c) displacement of adult unemployed by the subsidized new recruits. Finding these determinants of the optimal voucher differential between the youth and adult unemployed is one of the most fundamental problems of government policy towards youth unemployment. It has received little if any attention in the analytical employment policy literature thus far.
Several of these determinants have been measured in empirical evaluations of employment policies; particular emphasis is commonly given to 'deadweight' (hiring in the absence of the vouchers, representing the waste from giving vouchers to people who would have found jobs anyway) and 'displacement' (firing of existing employees as a result of hiring of subsidized new recruits, representing the waste from subsidizing people who drive others into unemployment). Thus far, however, there have been no attempts to examine the interaction between deadweight, displacement, and voucher effectiveness in a dynamic setting in order to investigate guidelines for government policy towards youth unemployment. This is the aim of this paper. We also examine how the government's employment policy should depend on the magnitude of unemployment benefits and the death rates of young and old people.
INTRODUCTION
The rate of youth llIwmployment in the OEeD is about twice as high as that of matun~workers with similar levels of education.
l Policy makers are divided on the appropriate government response. At one extreme are those who observe that relatively high rates of youth unemployment may be the efficient outcome of free market forces. After all, young workers often need time to clarify their job preferences and thus may wish to move in and out of employment until they have found a job that suits them: similarly, they often require time to find where their comparative advantages in skills lie and thus firms may wish to hire and fire them until they have found the appropriate match. In this context, there is no need for government intervention to reduce youth unemployment. At the other extreme of the policy debate are those who argue that, particularly in Europe, young people often get locked into states of long-term unemployment. Those who are not fortunate enough to find jobs reasonably promptly upon entering the workforce, it is claimed, find it progressively more difficult to gain employment later on; their skills are not able to improve through on-the-job training, and they become discouraged and stigmatized in the labor market. Under these circumstances. there may be a role for the government to play in reducing youth unemployment.
In many European countries, where aggregate unemployment appears to have been tn~nding upwards over nearly 25 years and where youth unemployment often leads to long-term adult unemployment, high rates of youth unemployment tend to be viewed as a problem. This view has received support in recent unemployment theories, such as insider-outsider, labor union, and efficiency wage theories. In Europe, young people tend to be particularly prone to the inefficiencies analyzed by these theories: they are more likely than their adult counterparts to be "outsiders" , disenfranchized in wage negotiations and unprotected by significant labor turnover costs; they often have comparatively little influence on union objectives; and employers' information about their productivity is often comparatively imperfect. These inefficiencies are usually magnified through European unemployment benefit systems. Unemployment benefits are commonly financed through taxes on employers and employees, and thus· unemployed people impose uncompensated costs on their employed counterparts. In addition, unemployment benefits tend to discourage job search, for when the unemployed find jobs, these benpfits are withdrawn and taxes are imposed. This problelll is particularly severe when the unemployed face low-wage jobs. Youn/!; people, by being comparatively prone to unemployment and comparatively likely to bc' associated with low-wagp jobs (relative to adults, Oil awrage). are particularly susceptible to these benefit-induced inefficiencies.
Accordingly, this paper assumes -quite plausibly' -that the government aims to minimize unemployment subject to a government budget constraint. We focus on one family of policy instruments for reducing unemployment: hiring subsidies for the unemployed. In practice, these instruments can come in many guises, such as tax breaks, vouchers, grants, and so OIL Since these are broadly equivalent in their impact, we will consider them jointly uner the heading "employment vouchers." These vouchers are an appropriate way of addressing the market failures highlighted by the insider-outsider, labor union, and efficiency wage theories, since these market failures all give rise to excessive wages and an associated deficient labor demand, whereas the vouchers reduce firm's labor costs and thereby stimulate labor demand.
We will give special attention to budget-balancing vouchers, i.e. vouchers that cost the government no more than the resulting fall in the government's expenditure on unemployment benefits. Given this policy approach, we will examine how the employment vouchers to the youth unemployed should differ from those to the adult umemployed. This problem will be investigated in the context of a simple, overlapping generations macroecollomic model of the labor market, taking into account the flows bet"Vf~en youth unemployment, adult employment, and adult unemployment. The flows will be pictured in terms of Markov transition probabilities. We will concentrate on steady states of the labour market.
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Within this setting, we will examine the circumstances when the government's employment policy should be age-dependent, i.e. when the youth employment vouchers should differ from the adult employment vouchers. We will show that the optimal employment vouchers to the youth unemployed may differ from those to the adult unemployment due to (a) youth-adult differences in hiring and separation rates in the absence of the vouchers, (b) youth-adult differences in the hiring effect of the vouchers (what we shall term "voucher effectiveness"), and (c) displacement of adult unemployed by the subsidized new recruits. Finding th~se determinants of the optimal voucher differential between the youth and adult unemployed is one of the most fundamental problems of government policy toward youth unemployment. It has received little if any attention in the analytical employment policy literature thus far.
Several of these determinants have been measured in empirical evaluations of employment policies; particular emphasis is commonly given to "deadweight" (hiring in the absence of the vouchers, representing the waste hom giving vouchers to people who would have found jobs anyway) and "displau~ment" (firing of existing employees as result of hiring of subsidized new recruits, representing the waste from subsidizing people who drive others into unemployment). Thus far, however, there have been no attempts to examine the interaction between deadweight, displacement. and voucher effectiveness in a dynamic setting in order to investigate guidelines for government policy toward youth unemployment. This is the aim of this paper. We will also examine how the government's employment policy should depend on the magnitude of unemployment benefits and the death rates of the young and old people.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our simple overlapping generations model of the labor market, describes the government's budget cOllstraint, and provides a general characterization of the optimal employment vouchers. To focus attention on the most important dynamic implications of employment vouchers, we then proceed to consider some simple fUllctional relations between the transition probabililites and the vouchers and we then derive the optimal longrun, self-financing vouchers. Section 3 begins by considering the simple case in which the firing probability for existing employees is constant (independent of the vouchers, so that there is no displacement), and the hiring probabiliti(~s of young and old workers are identical, linear functions of the vouchers to the young and old (respectively). In this baseline case, the optimal vouchers to the young and old are identical, so that the government has no distinctive youth unemployment policy. We show how these vouchers depend on deadweight, displacement, voucher effectiveness, autonomous job loss, and the death rates. Section 4 then extends this analysis that the young and old workers differ in terms of the hiring probability in the absence of the voucher (deadweight) and the responsiveness of the hiring probability to the voucher (voucher effectiveness), while the hiring functions are still assumed to be linear and there is no displacement. In this context, we derive how the difference in the optimal vouchers to the young and old workers depend on these differences in deadweight and voucher effectiveness. Section 5 examines the effect of displacement on the optimal vouchers. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
THE UNDERLYING MODEL
Time is discrete and \"orke1's can be in one of three states, employed and old, unemployed (/, '1/, ([ old or unemployed and YOU1/, , (j. The old are all those over one period old and people are assumed born unemployed. Let h y and h o be the probability that an unemployed voung worker and unemployed old workers will be hired, ami f be tlw probability that an old employed worker will become unemployed (e.g., be "tired"). (These hiring and firing probabilities will in general depend on the available employment vouchers, but this dependence need not be made explicit at this point.) Furthermore, let d,; and do be the death rates of the young and old, respectively; and let b,; and b o be the birth rates of children to those young and old.
2.1. Employment and UnemploY!llent. The number of old employed will come from three sources: (a) surviving old employed who are not fired, (b) hired young workers, and (c) hired old unemployed. Thus aggregate emploYI1H:mt NI may he expressed as follows:
Similarly, aggregate unemployment of old workers is:
Assuming that all workers are born unemployed, the aggregate unemployment of young workers is equal to the total number of births:
Eqs. (1) - (3) where Sf is a vector of labor market states:
and T is a transition matrix:
We focus on steady states of the labor market, and thus we assume that birth rates are eqnated to death rates; as a result of this assumption, the labor force L as well as the Humber of agents in each cohort will be constant throngh time.: l Clearly, the aggregat(~lahor force is the sum of aggregate employment (N,) and aggrq~ate unemployment (U;' + Un: (6) and similarly for tlJ(-~old and young labor forces, respectively:
vVhen birth rates are equal to death rates, the matrix T in our analysis (c.f., Eq. (5)) is a :'darkcl\i matrix with eigenvalues ofl-h o -fo-d o , 1 and d y -do-Convergence rates to steady states are thus increased as hire rates and fire rates for the old increase and depend on the difference of death rates as well as death rates directly_
It is straightforward to show that the steady state of the labor market is given by:
:lThis simplifying assumption is one of substance. If the employment vouchers, in raising employment, also raise the labour supply (by reducing the discouraged worker effect), then the Hmchers will have Cl smaller effect on unemployment than they would in the absence of a labour supply response. Orszag and Snower, Youth UnernplO!}1nent and Gove1'n 
The aggregate unemployment rate ' 1/, in the steady state is:
To gain understanding of this model of unemployment determination, it is worth mentionill)2; some simple special cases. \Vhen d = do = dy and 11. = 17. 0 = h'l the formula for the steady state ullemployment rate is:
this ullelllploylllent rate becomes:
When rl = do = d y but hire rat(~s differ by age we have:
These simple formulae will be usefully ill deriving the optimal voucher policies below.
2.2. The Government Budget Constraint. The government's budget constraint, relevallt to the determination of the unemploymentminimizing vouchers, may be specified straightforwardly as follows.
Let VY (vy,vl) ) and [T" ('uy,vl) ) be the IOllg-run unemployment level of the young and old, as et function of the vouchers V'I paid to young workers and v o ' paid to old workers. Then, since th~" number of old unemployed people hired ill each period is h o ( Vy, v o ) UO(vy, v o ) alld the number of young hired each period is h,lu Yl vo) UY(v'l' vo ) , the total cost of vouchers to the government is: (16) where v is the vector (v y, 'UI) ).4
This cost must be sd, against the "voucher revenue" , which is the total amount that the government saves OIl unemployment benefits due to the voucher-induced rise in the employment level. In particular, 4We note from Eq. (10) that UY depends only on death rates which are assumed independent of vouchers. (U(O) -U(v) ).
Finally, let C be the maximum lump-sum cost of the employment policy to the government. measured in units of national income per capita, where C could be positive, zero or negative.
Then the government budget constraint (GBC) is:
i.e. the cost of the (~ll1ployment vouchers must not exceed the maximum cost of the policy to the government (CL) plus voucher revenue 
(U(O) -U(v))
than voucher cost. But. provided that voucher cost rises faster with the level of he voucher than (loes voucher revenue, then at higher levels of the voucher (and lower levels of t.he unemployment benefit) an increase in the voucher will of course raise government spending, and at t.he policy optimum ..---when unemployment is minimized -the optimal employment voucher v = v* is such that the government budget constraint Eq. (17) holds as all equality:
2.3. The Optimal Employment Voucher. In the context of the labor market descril)(~d in Section 2.1 a.nd the government's budget constraint discribed ill Section 2.2, t.he government's aim, as noted, is to provide the employnwllt vouchers to the young and old workers that will minimize tIle level of a.ggregate unemployment in the long Orszag and Snower, Vo'u.th Unemploym, ent and Govemment Policy 8 run, subject to the government budget constraint. Given that the optimal voucher satisifies Eq. (17') as an equality, the optimal voucher is determined by fonning the Lagrangian (19)
and combining the first order conditions with respect to vy, 'V o to obtain the optimality condition:
Eq. (20) and Eq. (17') are a system of two nonlinear equations with two unknowns 'U'I and '00' In the next two sections, we derive the optimal policy explicitly for particular parametric forms of the hiring
y(v) and firing function f (v ).

OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISPLACEMENT
In this section we derive the optimal vouchers to the young and old workers in the context of a very simple baseline Illode!. vVe focus our attention on the bala nced-budget policies (C = 0). vVe assume the hiring rates to be lin(-~ar functions of the vouchers:
The coefficient Tlo stancls for deadwe'i,ght (the hiring rate in the absence of the voucher), 'lit is h'i"'inq l'esponsiveness (the effect of the voucher on the hiring rate); and '/10 is u:u.tonomous job loss (the rate at which employees become unemployed), Note that, for simplicity, the hiring rate for young workers is assumed to depend only on the youth voucher (and not on the voucher to the old workers). In practice, this is a reasonable approximation because, assuming that the period of "youth" lasts for about 7 years (approximately between the ages of 18 and 25), the effect of the ad ult voucher will be largely discounted when the young voucher recipients are hired (given reasonable values of the time discount factor).
Furthermore, we make the simplifying assumption that the fire rate is independent of vouchers, i.e., there is no displacement:
where "' 17" stands for "!:mployment" and "X' stands for "job loss".
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Finally, we a.<;sume that the hire rates are independent of age: 1]6 = 1]8 = Tlo and 'f/f = 'fIr = 'Ill, and death rates are independent of age as
In this case, the old unemployment rate is:
As we shall see, under these conditions, the optimal voucher is ageindependent: v = 'U y = 'U o . To show this, we begin by constraining the voucher to be age-independent, and observe that, by Eq.(13), voucher costs are:
and the voucher reveuues are:
Setting the voudwr costs equal tu the voucher revenues in the government budget constraint, we obtain the optimal balanced-budget voucher:
as an interior solution (i.e. the hiring rate lies between zero and unity at the optimal voucher).
Appendix A verifies that this voucher, which sets 'U y = 'U o satisfies Eq. (20), and thus the age-independent voucher is optimal, at least locally. Note that Eq. (25) is 'specific to the case of zero government spending but that the age-independent voucher result holds for any level of governmynt spending. The implicatio'n of this result is worth spelling out: even if the youth unemployment rate is far above the adult unemployment rate, the government should not offer young workers a larger voucher than old workers, provided that there is no displacement and the hiring functions of the young and old workers are identical functions of the youth and adult vouchers (respectively). It can be shown that this result continues to hold when the model is extended to allow for age-dependent death rates, since the optimal voucher is depends only on the death rate of the old (and not on that of the young).5
Eq. (25) implies that the optimal voucher depends:
• negatively on deadweight, 5This can be verified explicitly. In additioll, a program w'hich verifies this numerically is available: ftp: / /www.econ.bbk.ac . uk/lmig/vouchers/ olgage. f90. • positively on the unemployment benefit.
• positively on hiring responsiveness, and • negatively on autonomous job loss.
• negatively on the death rate of the old.
OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS UNDER AGE-DEPENDENT HIRING R.ATES
We now assume death rates are constant but hiring rates depend on age. In this case it can be shown that the difference between young vouchers and old vouchers is
independent of the level of governmellt spending. This is a striking result: in the absence of displacement, the difference between the youth voucher and the adult voucher is equal to half the difference between ratio of deadweight and voucher effectiveness of old and young workers. In other words, the youth voucher rises n~lative to the adult voucher (a) the greater is the adult deadweight and the smaller is the youth deaclweight and (b) the smaller is the adult voucher effectiveness and the greater is the youth voucher effectiveness.
This result is also robust to allowing death rates to depend on age. Details of the proof are provided in Appendix B.
OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS WITH DISPLACEMENT
We now consider the influence of displacement OIl the optimal employment voucher policy. Having assumed thus far that the voucher affects the hiring but not the firing rate, the analysis above has excluded the possibility of displacement. We now relax this assumption and suppose, instead, that both the hiring and firing rate depend positively and linearly on the size of the voucher: With displacement, we assume that: (27) where /\0 and Al are positive parameters. We find G that increasing displacement tends to illcrease the youth voucher relative to the old voucher even if death and hire rates a.re constant across .age. In particular, the mere existence of displacement is enough to justify payillg a higher voucher to the young. It is helpful to compare the effects of the optimal voucher with that of the optimal uniform voucher. This helps to assess how much a more complicated policy adds in terms of employment effects.
The optimal flat vouchers with G = 0 are (using formulae in Orszag and Snower (March 1996) but substituting Aa + do for Aa):
where:
One interesting property of this optimal v* is that the voucher rises with the square root of benefits rather than benefits. In Orszag and
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Snower (March 1996)), we show that the optimal voucher is lowered by:
• An increase in deadweight (170) .
• A decrease in ullemployment benefits ((3).
• An increase in displacement (Ad· There are correspollding results in Orszag and Snower (March 1996) for positive government spending.
7 For the non-uniform voucher case, we find similar qualitative effects.
With constant hiring rates, the quantitative differences between fiat vouchers and age-dependent vouchers tend in most cases to be small. In Fig. (2) we plot the relative difference in vouchers 8 and the difference is less than 20% which corresponds to a small effect on total unemployment.
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One problem with this analysis is that we have assumed that the labour market is effectively segmented in that the fire rate of old workers does not depend on the vouchers of the young and only on that of old workers. Thus, we replace Eq. (27) with:
A positive value of A2 reduces the optimal voucher premium to the young, as illustrated in the calibration exercise below.
LO One result of interest is that even if the coefficients Al and A2 are equal, there is still a voucher differentialY
It is useful to cOllsider a simple calibration exercise to give some rough indications of the practical irnplications of our model. To do so, we move to a discretizatioll in terms of quarters; this poses some issues of interpretatioll and a better model would illvolve a continuum of durations where discretization issue,S do not arise; however, such a model is considerably more complicated and certainly beyond the scope of this paper. The average unemployment spell in the absence of vouchers is~. We consider 'fJo = 0.25 corresponding to an average spell of 4 quarters. We set () = 0.15 (one quarter the replacement ratio) and consider balanced-budget policies (where G = 0). The average tenure in a job in the absence of vouchers is -i;; we set Ao = (l.03 corresponding to an average tenure of slightly under 10 years in Britain (c.f., Burgess and Rees (December 1994) ). We set the death rate equal to 0.0075 corresponding to an average working life of about 33 years. There are some estimates of separation and hiring elasticities with respect to wages in the literature (c.f., Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1991) and Krueger (1988) for hiring; Cam'pbell (1993) and Shaw (1985) for separations) which led Card and Krueger (Card and Krueger (1995) ) to conclude hiring elasticities range from 0.5 to 4.0 and that the separation elasticity was about 1.0. Since these elasticities are defined with respect to permanent changes in real wages whereas the employment vouchers are short-lived, the associated voucher elasticities will be substantially smaller. Snower (forthcoming, 1996) provides arguments Table ( 1) presents a variety of calcnlations using our model for different values of the voucher effectiveness coefficient "It and the displacement coefficients At and A2' The baseline unemployment rate, given our choice of parameters TJo and Aa, is 10.7%.12 The results indicate that for realistic elasticity values, a balanced-budget voucher can have an a significant effect in reducing unemployment. The size of the youth voucher is particularlv sensitive to the value of A2 because most of the population is old and as a resnlt small displacement coefficients will displace more workers than are· hired as a result of the voucher.
CONCLUSION
This paper has' provided a simple analytical groundwork for the formulation of government policy towards youth unemployment. We have focused attention on one specific, useful policy problem: the derivation of employment vouchers (subsidies) for unemployed youth and adults that minimize aggregate unemployment, given the government's budget constraint. In this context, our analysis shows how the optimal youth and adult vouchers should depend on certain key features of labor market activity: deadweight (the hiring rates of the young and old workers in the absence of the vouchers), displacement (the effect of the vouchers on the separation rate), voucher effectiveness (the response of the hiring rates of t.he young and old workers to the vouchers), the death rates, and the level of unemployment benefits. 
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Our analysis suggests that these policy issues are of great potential significance. For a wide range of plausible parameter values, as shown in Table 1 , our model indicates that the imple~entationof optimal employment vouchers can lead to significant reductions in unemployment at no extra cost to the government. In addition, setting 'v y = kv o and solving for zeroes of k leads to a unique solution of k = 1. Therefore, the optimal voucher is flat. Note also that the derivatives do not depend OIl the level of government spending so that the optilTlal voucher is also flat with policies where the government runs et surplus or a deficit. 
